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Abstract. There has been an ongoing conflict regarding whether reality is 
fundamentally digital or analogue. Recently, Floridi has argued that this dichotomy is 
misapplied. For any attempt to analyse noumenal reality independently of any level of 
abstraction at which the analysis is conducted is mistaken. In the pars destruens of 
this paper, we argue that Floridi does not establish that it is only levels of abstraction 
that are analogue or digital, rather than noumenal reality. In the pars construens of 
this paper, we reject a classification of noumenal reality as a deterministic discrete 
computational system. We show, based on considerations from classical physics, why 
a deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems (e.g., a reversible 
computational universe cannot be strictly deterministic). 
1 Introduction 
Recently, Luciano Floridi has argued that the dichotomy between a digital ontology 
and an analogue one is misapplied, since any attempt to analyse noumenal reality 
independently of any level of abstraction (LoA) is mistaken. This argument recasts, in 
a new light, Kant’s thesis and antithesis of the second antinomy of pure reason (1996, 
vv. A 434–5/B 462–3). The thesis claims (roughly) that every composite substance in 
the world consists of simple parts. The antithesis claims (roughly) that no composite 
thing in the world consists of simple parts. 
Floridi proposes a thought experiment that supposedly shows why a classification 
of reality as digital is wrong. The last part of this thought experiment, so he 
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misapplied. For reality in itself1 could be neither digital nor analogue, though it might 
be experienced as either depending on how the epistemic agent is related to it (Floridi, 
2011, §14.3). Floridi claims that digitality and analogicity are features of the LoAs 
adopted to analyse reality, rather than of reality in itself. We find this thought 
experiment (at least as it stands) and the reasoning behind it to be not compelling. 
This is the target of the pars destruens of our paper. 
In the pars construens, we argue for a more modest conclusion, namely that the 
universe is not a deterministic discrete computational system. Tackling head on the 
question of whether reality is digital or analogue requires treading on a very slippery 
path. Instead, we show why, based on considerations in classical physics, a 
deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems. Our critique 
proceeds in two parts, because the universe may be construed as either a reversible or 
an irreversible (deterministic) computational system. We first criticise the view that 
the universe is an irreversible computational system based on considerations of the 
decline of information in the universe. Subsequently, we criticise the view that the 
universe is a reversible computational system by examining different implications of 
this view (e.g., the universe can no longer be strictly deterministic). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly gives a preparatory discussion 
of the differences among analogicity/continuity, digitality/discreteness and 
computationality/computability. The first part of Section 3 outlines Floridi’s  main 
argumentation and thought experiment and the second proceeds to the criticism 
thereof. In Section 4 we offer an argument that focuses on the intimate relation 
between discrete irreversible computation and the growth and destruction of 
                                                        
1 Some writers, for a variety of reasons some of which may be epistemological, are leery of using the 
qualifier  ‘in  itself’ when discussing reality. For a  robust defence of  this usage (in an epistemological 
context) see Galen Strawson’s analysis (2008). 
 3 
information. Section 5 presents various challenges to a deterministic reversible 
computational view of the universe. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Analogicity, Digitality and Computationality 
In this section, we briefly discuss some pertinent distinctions between analogicity and 
continuity, digitality and discreteness as well as between computationality and 
computability. These sometimes-subtle distinctions matter for the ensuing discussion 
about digitality and analogicity as features of reality and the computational view of 
the universe. 
Some may find it unfortunate that the question about whether reality is continuous 
or discrete has been recast in terms of analogue or digital. For one thing, the 
analogue/digital distinction is sometimes applied to systems of representation, and 
there seems little reason to view the whole universe as such a system. Second, several 
authors have argued that the analogue/digital distinction should be kept separate from 
the continuous/discrete distinction (cf. Blachowicz, 1997; Lewis, 1971; Maley, 2010). 
This is part of a longstanding debate about modes of representation. Some have also 
argued that computation is the processing of representations (cf. Pylyshyn, 1984; 
O’Brien  &  Opie,  2006). It follows, by their lights, that a computational universe 
processes representations too. Yet, others, including the first author, have argued 
against the representational view of computation (cf. Fresco, 2010; Piccinini, 2007). 
For our purposes here, we remain neutral about the representational character of 
computation. 
We restrict our discussion to discrete computation and only adhere to the 
digital/analogue distinction where Floridi uses it explicitly in criticising digital 
ontology. Consider the case of conventional digital computers. They operate 
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discretely when considered in some ways and continuously when considered in some 
others. At one LoA, digital computers, like finite state automata (FSAs) and Turing 
machines (TMs), clearly move from one distinct state S1 to another S2 settling on S2 
without settling on any other “intermediate”  states.  However,  at  the  electrical  LoA, 
the voltage flowing through an electronic digital computer does not simply “stop” at 
some voltage level, say, 0.5v and then “jump” to another, say, 1.5v. Rather, it flows 
continuously between 0.5v to 1.5v. This shows one problem for equating the 
digital/analogue distinction with the discrete/continuous one. In the pars construens 
we shall resort to using ‘discrete’ (rather than ‘digital’) and take it to be the relational 
property of being separate and distinct. 
By way of concluding this section, we make some brief observations about the 
difference between computation and computability. The intension of a function is its 
definition that specifies the relationship that holds between inputs and corresponding 
outputs. A function can also be characterised extensionally as a set of ordered pairs 
that pair up the arguments and values of the function (i.e., a set of ordered input-
output pairs). As a function, this set is such that no two input elements are a part of 
more than one input-output pair. Using the Church-Turing Thesis, we might say that a 
function is (Turing-) computable iff there exists an algorithm (or a TM) that computes 
it. The algorithm follows a specific sequence of instructions for converting (legal) 
input into the corresponding output (Rapaport, 1998: p. 403). 
For the present purposes, the assertion that the (evolution of the) universe is 
computable is equivalent to the assertion that there is an (or a collection of 
interrelated) algorithm(s) for “computing the evolution of the universe”. Note that this 
assertion is not equivalent  to  “the  evolution  of  the  universe  is computational”. For 
whilst the evolution of the universe may be computable, it need not result from the 
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execution of some algorithm(s) (i.e., it need not be computational).  “After  all,  a 
computable function need not be given as [an algorithm]: it might just be [given as] a 
set of input output pairs [… in the form of] a table look-up” (ibid, p. 404).2 
Consider the case of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. One might argue that the 
solar system evolves in a way describable by Kepler’s laws. It can possibly be argued 
that these laws are computable and that a description of planetary motion in the solar 
system in terms of computability has explanatory power. By contrast, it is also 
possible to argue that the solar system does not execute algorithm(s), that is, it is not 
computational. There may certainly be some causal process that maps what seems to 
be “input” to some corresponding “output” (i.e., computable by extension), but it need 
not be computational. This last part is further discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
3 Problems  with  Floridi’s  Argument and Fourfold Thought 
Experiment 
3.1 An outline of Floridi’s argument and thought experiment 
In making his case against digital ontology, Floridi argues that two related questions 
need to be distinguished (2011, p. 320). The first question concerns the modelling of 
the physical universe asking whether the universe might be adequately modelled by 
digital computation, independently of whether it is actually digitally computational in 
itself. The second question concerns the ultimate nature of the physical universe 
asking whether the universe might actually be digital and computational in itself, 
independently of how it can be adequately modelled.  
                                                        
2 Of course, if this set of input-output pairs is infinite, it is questionable whether it can be “given” in an 
effective sense. 
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Having distinguished these two questions, Floridi turns in the third part of his work 
(2011, §14.3) to addressing the latter.3 He follows this in the fourth part by 
considering objections and replies (Floridi, 2011, §14.4). The main conclusion argued 
for in the third part is the following.  
“[I]t  is  not  so  much  that  reality  in  itself  is  not  digital,  but  rather  that,  in  a 
metaphysical context, the digital vs. analogue dichotomy  is  not  applicable” 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 325). 
After outlining the argument for this conclusion he attempts to make it more vivid and 
intuitive by way of a thought experiment using four idealised agents. We begin with 
his outline. 
The starting point of Floridi’s argument is the following conditional. 
“If  the  ultimate  nature  of  reality  in  itself  is  digital,  this  implies  that  it  is  either 
digital or analogue” (Floridi, 2011, p. 325). 
He observes (in Floridi, 2011, fn. 11) that the ‘or’ in this conditional is being treated 
“for  the  sake  of  simplicity”  as  “logic  disjunction”,  that  is,  weak  or  inclusive 
disjunction, and adds that “[n]othing depends on this simplification”. His intention is 
to show that the consequent of this conditional is false and to conclude (by Modus 
Tollens) that the antecedent is false, i.e., that the ultimate nature of reality in itself is 
not digital. 
Floridi claims that he can show that the consequent is mistaken in two steps. Step 
one is to argue that even if it were true, an epistemic agent facing an (at least partly) 
analogue world of experience would not be able to establish its truth. He raises some 
objections to this that lead him to put more weight on the second step in which he 
argues that:  
                                                        
3 He focuses on digitality from Section 14.3 on. We bring the computational back in in Sections 4 and 
5. 
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“[T]he  intrinsic nature of  reality does not have  to be digital or  analogue because 
the dichotomy might well be misapplied. Reality is experienced, conceptualised 
and  known  as  digital  or  analogue  depending  on  the  […  LoA]  assumed  by  the 
epistemic agent when interacting with it. Digital and analogue are features of the 
LoA modelling the system, not of the modelled system in itself” (Floridi, 2011, p. 
325). 
 
The  term  ‘LoA’ used  in  the above paragraph needs  some brief  explanation.  It is 
used in modelling to refer both to the modelling process and the resulting model. An 
LoA taken to be an object of study (a “system”) consists of a finite, non-empty set of 
observables which are interpreted typed variables. Floridi gives as a simple example 
traffic lights where abstracting away from other features of the system the single 
observable,  called  ‘colour’,  has  the  type  {red,  amber, green} with the usual 
interpretation for these three colours of the lights. Thought of as a modelling process, 
the input to the LoA is the system under study and its output is a model of that 
system. When an LoA comes with constraints on the possible combinations of values 
its observables can take it is called a moderated LoA (Floridi, 2009, pp. 165–166). An 
LoA is called discrete iff the types of all its observables have only finitely many 
possible values and analogue iff none of the types of its observables has finitely many 
possible values (otherwise, it is hybrid). The traffic light example with a single 
observable with a three-element type is discrete. 
Back  to  Floridi’s  argument.  He  draws  both  a  negative  conclusion  from  this 
reasoning and a positive conclusion from it when it is supplemented by a further 
premise. The negative conclusion is that one cannot know whether reality in itself is 
digital or analogue. We may note that the stronger conclusion that it is neither digital 
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nor analogue is held to follow from the second step and a fortiori so is his intended 
conclusion that reality in itself is not digital. The positive conclusion is that structural 
realisms, which treat the intrinsic nature of reality as relational and hence neither 
digital nor analogue, have rivals eliminated and have room created for their 
development. 
Having outlined his argument Floridi presents a four stage thought experiment  
“(i)n  order  to  develop the  arguments”  (2011, p. 326). Our interest is mostly in the 
fourth stage of this thought experiment but we will very briefly characterise here the 
first three. At stage one, we are asked to imagine an agent, Michael, who has the 
capacity to tell whether reality in itself is digital or analogue. There is an interesting 
discussion of how this might be possible for a superhuman or ideal agent that need not 
detain us here. At stage two, a second agent, Gabriel, who works as an interface 
between reality in itself (as determined by Michael) and the world, which is observed 
by Raphael (a third agent), ensures that whatever way the world is Raphael gets an 
analogue  “view”  of  it.  If  the  world  is  digital,  Gabriel  uses  a  digital  to  analogue 
converter  (DAC)  and  if  it  is  analogue,  Gabriel  “uses  it  as  his  input  to  produce  an 
analogue reality” (Floridi, 2011, pp. 329–330). In the first two stages reality in itself is 
assumed to be digital or analogue. At stage three, given only this analogue view, 
Raphael cannot tell whether reality in itself is digital or analogue. 
At the fourth stage, it is stipulated that another agent, Uriel, builds a wheel with 
four  nodes  “containing”  either  a  DAC  or  an  analogue  to  digital  converter  (ADC) 
alternating around its perimeter (Floridi, 2011, §14.3.4). The diagram representing 
this has two of each with Uriel at the axle. Floridi writes:  
“Uriel’s  wheel  generates  a  system—as an output from an analogue or digital 
ontology—which will be observed by Raphael as being either analogue or digital 
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depending on the latter’s position with respect to the wheel. It is now obvious that 
it makes no sense to  ask  whether  the  system  is  digital  or  analogue  in  itself” 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 333).4 
 
Floridi’s argument, though essentially completed here, concludes in part 4 with a 
discussion of and replies to three objections. We leave aside Floridi’s  second 
objection, which concerns the relation between his argument and Kant’s. His first 
objection is that perhaps the argument developed through the thought experiment in 
stages 1-3 begs the question by stipulating what needs to be proved. The third one is 
that his argument may illegitimately assume that all LoA are on a par and so no 




We begin evaluation of Floridi’s argument with a  relatively minor point concerning 
his remarks about the ‘or’ in his important first premise:  
“If the ultimate nature of reality in itself is digital, this implies that it is either 
digital or analogue” (Floridi, 2011, p. 325). 
 
He says that nothing depends on the simplifying assumption of treating it as weak 
disjunction. But this is a mistake. If the ‘or’ were stronger (e.g. exclusive ‘or’), then 
the conditional may not be true5 and in that case any argument using it as a premise 
would be unsound. As it happens, on his reading, it is true (even a logical truth) and 
we can consider the first step in his argument. As Floridi notes himself there is an 
                                                        
4 Floridi takes quantum mechanical wave particle duality to be a less metaphysical example. 
5 An example where it might nevertheless be true is if the disjuncts are necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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epistemological gap in the first step “for it establishes, at best, only the unknowability 
of the intrinsically digital (or analogue) nature of reality” (ibid). Not knowing that q, 
of course, is in general not sufficient to establish ~q. The second step is stronger but a 
key premise for it remains inadequately supported, viz. that digital and analogue are 
features of some particular LoA modelling the system, not of the modelled system in 
itself. The second clause of this claim is crucial but not well supported. 
In a preliminary characterisation of the last step of his argument Floridi writes: 
“the  alternative  digital  vs.  analogue may  easily  be  misapplied,  when  talking  about 
reality in itself, because the latter could be neither, while it might be experienced as 
either digital or analogue depending on how the epistemic agent is related  to  it” 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 327). 
Here the claim is the modally weakened one that reality in itself could be neither 
analogue nor digital. We are not disagreeing with this claim, but as it is it will not 
feed into his Modus Tollens to support the conclusion that reality in itself is not 
digital. 
Floridi considers the plausibility of an intermediate position in the third objection 
considered. 
“[S]omeone might argue that it is reasonable that, if our best fundamental physical 
theory is, say, digital, then this gives us good reason to think that the fundamental 
nature of reality is digital. This is not deductive warrant, but it does appear to provide 
some degree of justification” (Floridi, 2011, p. 336). 
 
However, he ends up arguing that:  
“Once  we  accept  that  epistemology  is  LoA-based and that no ontology can be 
LoA-free, then a second, but equally crucial move consists in realising that digital and 
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analogue are features of the LoAs adopted to analyse reality, not features of reality in 
itself, or, to put it differently, that digital and analogue features are internal features of 
the models made possible by various LoAs, not external features of the systems 
modelled by LoAs. So the argument is not just that some LoAs show reality to be 
digital, while others show it to be analogue, and that we cannot decide which LoAs 
are better, but, far more importantly, that some LoAs are digital and some are 
analogue and that, depending on which of them we adopt (because of requirements, 
goals etc., i.e., teleologically), reality will be modelled as digital or analogue” (ibid). 
  
Here again, without sufficient warrant, Floridi says that we realise “that digital and 
analogue are features of the LoAs adopted to analyse reality, not features of reality in 
itself” (ibid, italics added). But there is a lack of justification. Where is it shown that 
although purportedly we cannot help but view reality through our LoAs and they will 
be either analogue or digital6, reality in itself is neither? A possible objection is that 
the question itself should not be asked. But even granted that for every LoA there are 
some questions that cannot be meaningfully asked and which are unanswerable in 
principle (Floridi, 2009, p. 166), it does not follow that some questions cannot be 
meaningfully asked and are in principle unanswerable at any LoA. 
We are not rejecting the conclusion that reality in itself is neither digital nor 
analogue, but rather questioning the reasoning involved in this particular path to it. It 
is our view that the fourth stage of the thought experiment is not  “(a) good way of 
making  sense of  the  conclusion” (Floridi, 2011, p. 332).   When considering Uriel’s 
wheel in the fourth stage of the thought experiment it has been asserted as obvious, 
but has not been established, that it “makes no sense to ask whether the system is 
                                                        
6 We follow Floridi here in omitting the third possibility that they be hybrid. 
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analogue or digital in itself” (Floridi, 2011, p. 333). However, without appealing to 
merely stipulated extra features of LoAs, this is not obvious and stipulating this 
arrangement does not provide the needed justification. 
4 An Argument Against Irreversible Computational Ontology  
Floridi’s  second  question  in  Section  3.1 about whether the ultimate nature of the 
physical universe might be actually discrete and computational forms the backdrop 
for the ensuing discussion. Because computation can be either reversible or 
irreversible, in this section we argue against the view of the universe as a 
deterministic irreversible discrete computation.  
Let us briefly explain what the difference between reversible and irreversible 
computation is. A logical operation takes a finite number of distinct input states c and 
maps them to a finite number of output states d. An operation for which each output 
state, β,  has exactly one possible  input  state, α,  is  logically  reversible. Given any β 
state, it is always possible to determine the corresponding α  state. For this reason, 
logical reversibility (and reversible computation) implies the conservation of 
information. For example, the negation operation (NOT) is fully reversible. Logical 
conjunction has only one reversible path: the one yielding ‘1’  as output. This path 
preserves information about the history of the computation. There can be only one 
combination of input bits that yields ‘1’ as output: (1, 1).  
Irreversible computation, on the other hand, implies the discarding of information. 
An operation for which an output state, β, has more than one possible input state, α, is 
logically irreversible. When a conventional Boolean AND-gate produces the 
equivalent of a  ‘0’,  it discards  information  regarding  the original values of  its  input 
lines. Logical conjunction is, therefore, an irreversible operation. Since all three input 
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combinations (0, 1), (1, 0) and (0, 0) yield the same output, information regarding the 
history  of  the  bitwise  conjunction  operation  is  discarded,  once  the  ‘0’  output  is 
produced. We now turn to our critique. 
Our argument7 may be summarised as follows. 
‚ (P1) The universe is a deterministic irreversible discrete computational system. 
‚ (P2) Deterministic irreversible discrete computation is an information 
discarding process. 
‚ Therefore, (IC/P3) the overall amount of information in the universe decreases 
over time to a lower level. 
‚ However, according to the second law of thermodynamics, (P4) if the universe 
is a closed system, then it will reach a state of equilibrium with maximal 
entropy and thus, maximal information. 
‚ Hence, on the assumption that the universe is a closed system, (C) either P3 or 
P4 is false. 
The gist of this argument is that the assertion that the universe, interpreted as a 
closed system, is a deterministic discrete irreversible computational system implies 
that the second law of thermodynamics is false. But this is an absurd consequence. 
Whilst the first premise (P1) is not explicitly endorsed by discrete computational 
ontologists (as far as we know),  it  should  be  tackled  before  its  “reversible” 
counterpart is challenged. According to Eric Steinhart, for example, “[u]ltimate reality 
is computational space-time, and that is just the universal metaphysical hardware into 
which  particular  physical  worlds  are  programmed”  (1998, p. 117). According to 
Konrad Zuse, “the universe could be conceived as a gigantic computing machine […] 
                                                        
7 This argument elaborates on and defends the following observation made by Pieter Adriaans and 
Peter  van  Emde  Boas.  “If  deterministic  computation  is  an  information  discarding  process then it 
implies that the amount of information in the universe rapidly decreases. This contradicts the second 
law of thermodynamics” (Adriaans & Van Emde Boas, 2011, p. 16). 
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a relay calculator” (1993, p. 104). Yet, he does not identify this “gigantic computing 
machine” with a reversible one. John Wheeler adds that “[e]vidently we must have an 
irreversible world if we are to have a world of distinguishability and meaning” (1982, 
p. 570, italics added).  
Computational ontologists typically conceive the universe as a cellular automaton 
(CA) (cf. Fredkin, 1990; Wolfram, 2002), rather than as a TM (Turing machine). 
However, the particular type of discrete computational system in question matters 
little for the purposes of this argument. It does not matter whether we view the 
universe as, say, a deterministic CA, a TM or an FSA (i.e., a finite state automaton). 
The main point is whether in the process of computation the overall amount of 
information either increases or decreases. The same measure can be used for 
quantifying the growth or destruction of information processed by CAs, TMs or 
FSAs.  
There are two basic ideas underlying discrete computational ontology. The first 
one is that space, time and every entity and process in the universe are ultimately 
discrete. The Finite Nature Hypothesis states that “space and time are discrete and that 
the number of possible states of every finite volume of space-time is finite” (Fredkin, 
1992). Accordingly, all measurable quantities of physics arise from some Planck scale 
substrate for information processing. The second idea is that all these information 
processes proceed in discrete state-transitions, which are in principle Turing-
computable. 
The crux of our argument is establishing the plausibility of the second premise 
(P2). Deterministic irreversible discrete computations have a very limited capacity to 
produce new information, and over time they discard information. In a similar manner 
to the conjunction operation that produces a ‘0’, the calculation of x + y = z (for x, y, z 
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Œ ℕ+) discards information (as in the case of button presses of a simple calculator) 
unless the input is somehow  “saved”  temporarily. The input of this calculation 
contains, roughly, (logx + logy) bits of information, whereas its output contains, 
roughly, log(x + y) bits (i.e., less information). The amount of information lost in the 
calculation corresponds to the information that is needed to separate z into x and y. In 
general, for the positive integers, since there are many possible pairs of addends 
adding up to the output z (for either z>3 or, if the input is ordered, z>2), an algorithm, 
which computes the function F(x, y) = x + y, discards information about the precise 
history of the computation. 
An irreversible computational system discards information by its very nature. Over 
time, such a system loses the information that is needed to reverse its computational 
history (e.g., reversing a logical conjunction operation  that  yields  a  ‘0’)8. The 
destruction of information about the history of the computation is conveyed by 
Landauer’s  principle  of  logical  irreversibility9 (1961). If irreversible deterministic 
computational processes either preserve10 or discard information, then over time the 
overall information is very likely to decrease. The more many-to-one input-to-output 
relations the computation has the more information about its history is lost, for there 
are increasingly many more paths the computation could have taken whilst producing 
the same output. An idealised TM may use its infinite tape to record information 
about the history of the computation performed as it scans symbols and changes its 
states. However, in a finite universe infinite storage is unavailable. The computational 
process in question discards information (otherwise, it would have been reversible). 
                                                        
8 Of course, the destruction of information does not apply to all outputs of deterministic discrete 
computations, for example, as observed above, logical conjunction that yields a ‘1’. 
9 This principle states the minimum amount of entropy (released into the environment) that is the cost 
of erasing one bit of information. 
10 This is consistent with Calude’s result that discrete computation can only generate new information 
upper bounded by a constant (2009, pp. 84–85).  
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It should now be clear how the intermediate conclusion (IC/P3), which follows 
from P1 and P2, is inconsistent with the second law of thermodynamics. This is the 
case provided that the universe is a closed system. Zuse, for example, held that the 
entire universe could be seen as a closed system where each state is a function of its 
preceding state (1970). Indeed, if we view the universe (or ultimate reality) as finite, 
then by implication there is nothing physical outside the universe. By definition, the 
universe is a unique, individual whole – a closed system – without an external 
“environment”. 
If the processes in this universe are deterministic irreversible discrete computations 
that discard, rather than increase, information, then over time the universe reaches a 
lower level of information. However, according to the second law of thermodynamics, 
closed systems converge to equilibrium, at which point they are in a state of maximal 
entropy and therefore maximal information (see next paragraph). So, even if some 
regions of the universe (as subsystems) have low entropy (and therefore low 
information) in some time interval, eventually the universe (and all its subsystems) 
will converge to equilibrium and reach a state of maximal information. It follows then 
that either P3 or P4 has to be rejected. It is our contention that P3 has to be rejected, 
and so should P1. 
Since P3 has to be rejected, either P1 or P2 has to be false. There is some plausible 
evidence for keeping P4. The second law of thermodynamics has a good track record 
of producing reliable conclusions in many scientific applications.11 If we keep P4 but 
reject P3, then either P1 or P2 is false. On the one hand, P1 is highly speculative and 
impractical, if not impossible, to corroborate. On the other hand, P2 is evidenced by 
                                                        
11 Consider, for example, the original formulation of the second law of thermodynamics by Rudolf 
Clausius. According to his formulation, heat cannot flow spontaneously from a cold reservoir to a hot 
reservoir without external work being performed on the system. This is easily evident from everyday 
experience of refrigeration (Bais & Farmer, 2008, pp. 613–614). 
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simple cases of computation as illustrated above for AND-gates and summation. We 
conclude that P1 is false. 
Some qualifications are called for in relation to premises P3 and P4. P3 does not 
spell out which conception of information is used. The information referred to in P2 is 
analysed in terms of algorithmic information. For P3 to follow from premises P1 and 
P2 it has to consistently use the same conception of information. P4, however, makes 
use of Shannon information that is compatible with thermodynamic entropy. So as it 
stands, our argument equivocates  on  ‘information’.  There  are  certainly  conceptual 
differences between algorithmic information and Shannon information that influence 
the way the relevant equations are used in the analysis of the phenomenon in question. 
Thus, some caution has to be exercised.12 
However, in the present context, the two conceptions may be used interchangeably. 
Firstly, it has been shown that for any computable probability distribution, the 
expected value of algorithmic information equals Shannon information, up to a fixed 
constant term depending only on the distribution (cf. Li & Vitányi, 2008, pp. 602–
608; Teixeira et al., 2011). Our argument centres on a universe where everything is 
supposedly computational, so probability distributions are computable. Hence, the 
two conceptions may be used interchangeably admitting that there is a quantitative 
difference that is upper bounded by a fixed constant, which depends on the probability 
distributions of the information in question. Secondly, it has been recently shown that 
algorithmic entropy is not just analogous to thermodynamic entropy as a measure of 
disorder defined in statistical mechanics, rather it is a special case of thermodynamic 
entropy (Baez & Stay, 2010), which is typically associated with Shannon information. 
Here algorithmic entropy is defined as the information gained upon learning a 
                                                        
12 We thank Ariel Caticha for suggesting this caveat. 
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number, on the assumption that this number is the output of some randomly chosen 
program. Again, up to some error bounded by a constant, which depends on the 
selected programming language, algorithmic information is algorithmic entropy. 
P4 raises two interrelated questions regarding the anthropomorphic character of 
thermodynamic entropy and the universe being a closed system13. We start with the 
second one, ‘Is the universe a closed system?’ The space of the universe is populated 
by fields. A field has a finite number of degrees of freedom14 located at each point in 
space. It is claimed by some astronomers that the space of the universe is expanding 
by way of some clusters of galaxies moving away from others (Koupelis 2011, pp. 
520–521). Accordingly, the number of degrees of freedom is increasing. This is a 
signature of an open system (Caticha, personal correspondence).  
On the other hand, the universe may be deemed a closed system in the sense that 
there is nothing outside to interact with, so that its energy/mass is fixed. The 
assumption that the universe is a closed system seems to be consistent with the Finite 
Nature Hypothesis and the views of some computational ontologists (cf. Zuse 1970). 
For the purposes of this argument we adopt this latter view. As we have seen, 
reference to ‘the whole universe’ implies that there is nothing outside  it. This means 
that the universe has bounds, though they are very large. 
The second question concerns the applicability of theoretical entropy analyses of 
physical systems. Edwin Jaynes, for one, argued that “the  ‘entropy  of  a  physical 
system’ is not meaningful without  further qualifications” (1965, p. 398). “For it  is a 
property, not of the physical system, but of the particular experiments you or I choose 
to perform on it” (ibid). By these lights, (thermodynamic) entropy is not a property of 
                                                        
13 See footnote 12. 
14 A degree of freedom of a physical system is, roughly, a direction for potential action. A particle, for 
example, has three degrees of freedom, as it can move in any one of three independent possible 
directions in space. 
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the system but of the description of the system. This makes P4 problematic. For P4 
applies the second law of thermodynamics to the universe as a whole, rather than to 
an “isolated” experimental environment whose parameters are (supposedly) known to 
the experimenter. But then computational ontologists face a similar challenge. It is 
one thing to analyse a specific isolated physical system computationally where its 
relevant microstates are spelled out, but not when the computational analysis is 
extended to apply to the whole universe. 
Now that we have rejected the claim that the universe is a deterministic irreversible 
discrete computational system, we turn to point out the problems that follow from the 
claim that the universe is a deterministic and reversible discrete computational 
system.  
5 An Attack on Deterministic Reversible Computational Ontology 
In the previous section we have argued against irreversible computational ontology, 
because irreversibility implies the destruction of information. But Charles Bennett 
showed that logical irreversibility can be avoided in discrete computation in general 
(1973). In this section we offer a critique of the deterministic reversible computational 
conception of the universe (DRCU, for short). We argue that proponents of the DRCU 
view face the following challenges. 
CI.  The computational universe is the equivalent of an accelerated TM. 
CII. Determinism has to be given up. 
CIII. The Loschmidt's reversibility paradox. 
We conclude Section 5 with three more observations in the context of the DRCU view 
concerning miscomputation, input and the collection of garbage information. 
 20 
Let us elaborate on each of the three challenges in order, starting with CI. We 
begin with an analogy to Karl Popper’s Tristram Shandy argument15. The universe, 
on the DRCU view, is a closed system that computes its own behaviour in space and 
time according to some algorithm. Because the universe performs reversible 
computation, for every (irreversible) computational step Si›Si+1 the inverse step 
Si+1«Si has to be recorded. Russell’s Tristram Shandy paradox applies in 
consideration of the instantaneous description (ID) of the computational system (i.e., 
the universe). The ID of a TM, for example, is specified by the state of the controller, 
the entire tape contents and the position of the read/write head on the tape. 
Let us assume that the universe is a reversible TM, M, which is a multi-tape, multi-
head machine16. When M performs a single computational step Si›Si+1, the inverse 
step Si+1«Si is also recorded. In the construction of the reversible TM proposed by 
Bennett (1973) a history tape is used for that purpose. However, in a similar vein to 
Tristram Shandy’s autobiography, M always falls behind in capturing its precise ID at 
any given time. In the process of writing Si+1«Si to the history tape, M has already 
moved to Si+2. Even if M is arbitrarily quick, it must be incapable of bringing this ID 
completely up to date. Yet, an objection, as Popper remarked, might be raised at this 
point that there is no paradox here. If M (like Tristram Shandy) continually improves 
its methods of description or the speed of writing to the history tape, it may bring the 
ID more nearly up to date without a limit to this procedure (Popper, 1950b, p. 174). 
But what is the implication of such a procedure in the case of M? Arguably, it is 
that M is an accelerating machine. There is certainly no reason to assume that the 
                                                        
15 See the appendix or (Popper, 1950a, 1950b) for the details of this argument. 
16 This construction is merely meant to remove the constraint imposed on the standard TM of at most 
changing a single symbol on a scanned square at any given time. Parallel operations on different 
regions of the tape are disallowed. Strictly, the multi-tape extension is unnecessary. Importantly, 
neither the extra head(s) nor the extra tape(s) increases the computational power of the machine. 
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universe is a sequential TM. So, let us further assume that for any process in M 
performing the “standard” computation (call it C) thereby transitioning from S1 to S2 
to … Sn there is another process (call it R) recording these transitions to the history 
tape. For R to continually improve the speed of writing to the history tape there has to 
be some value, however small, by which its speed increases. This situation is akin to 
Zeno’s motion  paradox  of  Achilles  and  the Tortoise. R has to perform the second 
recording operation in, say, half the time taken to perform the first, the third in half 
the time taken to perform the second, and so on. We get a convergent series of 









 + ... + 1/2
n
 + … 
that converges to 2. The result is a computational process that can perform arbitrarily 
many recording operations before two consecutive moments of running time have 
elapsed. We do not argue here that accelerated TMs are logically impossible17, but 
this does raise problems for the DRCU view, not least because of the finiteness of the 
universe on this view (cf. Laraudogoitia, 2011). 
Moreover, to be able to record the computational history of C, R has to “observe” 
C and in so doing it participates in and affects C. In a similar manner to Popper’s 
Predictors interfering with each other in predicting future states,  by  recording  C’s 
state transitions, R interferes with C’s operations. “In obtaining initial information, the 
[observing system] must interact with the system in question, and this interaction 
introduces into the system a disturbance whose magnitude is unpredictable within a 
certain halo of uncertainty” (Popper, 1950a, p. 127). Checking pressure in a tyre, for 
example, is achieved by causing a release of air thereby causing a slight change in the 
                                                        
17 There are certainly those who argue that accelerating TMs are not logically impossible (e.g., 
(Copeland, 2002)). But the physical possibility of accelerating TMs in either an atomic universe or a 
quantum mechanical universe is highly questionable ((Davies, 2001, pp. 677–679)). 
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tyre’s pressure. The disturbance to C by the measurement of R inevitably renders C 
indeterministic, for the prediction of some events in C in accordance with the methods 
of science breaks down (Popper, 1950a, p. 118). If that is right, then due to the 
reversibility of the computational universe it is no longer strictly deterministic. This 
leads us to the second challenge, CII. 
The challenge is the (im)possibility of an algorithmic prediction in a deterministic 
computational ontology. Note that CII need not be specific to a reversible 
computational conception of the universe. As observed in Popper’s Predictors and the 
Oedipus effect arguments (see the appendix for more details), predictive self-
information, I, about the state of a computer, C, is liable to strongly interfere with this 
state, thereby destroying the predictive value of I (Popper, 1950b, pp. 188–189). What 
an algorithmic predictor C means here is that C can predict the state of some system 
(either C in itself, by way of self-prediction, or another system) ahead of time (i.e., 
before the time of the predicted event has elapsed). As the output of C we expect not 
only the answer (or the prediction result), but also the event or state in question to 
eliminate answers that are fortuitously correct. 
In the case of self-predictions of C, their character cannot be the same as a 
complete self-information of C. There will always be predictive questions about C in 
itself that C will be unable to answer correctly. The reason, as Popper argued, is that 
for I to be correct and up to date at some time ti, it would have to contain a physical 
description of that very self-information (leading to a regressive self-reference), using 
the same type of description as in the rest of its information (ibid, p. 190). This is 
clearly impossible in a finite universe. 
Similar arguments against the possibility of algorithmic predictions have been put 
forward more recently (Calude et al 1995; Wolpert, 2001). David Wolpert shows that 
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there cannot be a physical computer that can correctly predict any aspect of a future 
state of some physical system before that future state actually occurs (2001, pp. 
016128–1).  His  results  hold  for  a  computer  that  is  infinitely  fast,  has  an  infinite 
amount of time to perform the calculation (either before or after the predicted event 
occurs), has the correct value of the variable it is trying to predict explicitly contained 
in its initial input and regardless of whether this computer performs discrete or 
continuous computation (ibid, p. 016128-2).  
To establish such general results, Wolpert casts computation in terms of partitions 
of the space of possible world lines of the universe. The specification of the input of a 
particular physical computer at some given time is given by means of specifying a 
particular subset of all possible world lines of the universe, where different inputs to 
the computation correspond to different non-overlapping such subsets. The 
specification of the output is given in a similar manner. The impossibility of the 
relevant physical predictive computation in the universe is derived by a consideration 
of the relationship that exists among these types of partitions (ibid). 
 Wolpert’s key theorem is that there cannot be a computer to which one can pose 
all possible (binary) questions about the universe. The reasoning underlying the proof 
of this theorem is as follows. Consider two algorithmic predictors, P1 and P2, whose 
answer subpartitions are binary, and whose initialisation time (T0) equals 0 and 
question time equals T. P1 is set to predict the time T output bit of P2. P1 produces that 
prediction as its output and halts by time TX < T. P2 is set to predict the negation of 
P1’s time T output bit just before P2 halts. Since both P1 and P2’s output calculations 
must halt by TX, they will contradict each other when the prediction time T arrives. 
Hence, they cannot both correctly predict the question time. It is the need to specify 
both the question and the predictive answer in the output of P1 and P2 that ultimately 
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means that there cannot be two such physical predictors capable of being asked 
arbitrary questions concerning the output of the other. Note that this type of reasoning 
is applicable to any two discrete computers (ibid, p. 016128-7). 
In a similar vein, Cris Calude et al. show by resorting to algorithmic information 
theory that in a deterministic universe, whose evolution is (possibly) computable (but 
not necessarily computational), an algorithmic prediction is impossible (1995, §5). 
The motivation for this result also appears in Wolpert (2001, pp. 016128–1):  “[t]he 
universe cannot support the existence within it of a computer that can process 
information as fast as it can”. 
Let us briefly describe their proof. Let S be a computational system and x an input 
to S. TS (x) is the running time of S on input x. There exists a universal computational 
system U, such that for every S there exists a constant c (U, S), such that if S(x) = y, 
there exists an input x’, such that  
1. U(x’) = y (that is, U produces the same y as output on input x’) 
2. |x′| ≤ |x| + c(U, S) (where |x| is the length of the string x) 
For the sake of a contradiction, it is assumed that an algorithmic prediction is 
possible. Accordingly, U can simulate the predictor and thereby it can also act as a 
predictor. This in turn means that U can simulate any other computational systems in 
a shorter time (that is, TU (x’) < TS (x)). For every string x in the domain of U, let t(x) 
be the minimal running time necessary for U to produce U (x). Since U is a predictor, 
it follows from TU (x’) < TS (x) that there exists a string x’ such that U(x’) = U(x), and 
TU(x’) < t(x), which is false (Calude et al. 1995, §5). Thus, in an analogous manner to 
Popper’s  self-predictors,  every  universal  predictor  is  too  “slow”  for  some  tasks, 
particularly self- predicting time-consuming tasks. 
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Next we turn to the third challenge, CIII. Loschmidt's reversibility paradox18 states 
that, according to classical mechanics, a system of particles interacting with 
any forces and going through a sequence of states starting from some initial state, will 
go through the same sequence in reverse (returning to its initial state), if the velocities 
of all the particles are reversed. But this conflicts with the second law of 
thermodynamics, according to which for any such sequence of states (of a closed 
system) the entropy never decreases (i.e., the sequence cannot be reversed back to its 
initial state) (Modgil, 2009). This paradox poses a challenge to the DRCU view, 
provided that the computation may proceed in a “backward direction” (i.e., from some 
intermediate state back toward the initial state). If reversible computation is time-
symmetric, rather than unidirectional, then it may also proceed in an entropy-
decreasing direction contrary to the second law of thermodynamics.  
Several considerations seem to suggest that reversible computational processes 
may proceed  in a “backward direction” as well. For example, Fredkin and Toffoli’s 
billiard-ball model of a reversible computer uses reversible physical components 
(Fredkin & Toffoli, 1982). The presence of moving spherical billiard-balls at 
specified points are defined as 1s and their absence as 0s. Yet, this model relies on the 
motion of these balls in a friction-free environment. In a physical reality, these 
computing balls are very unreliable, since instability arises from arbitrarily small 
perturbations. This model requires a logically irreversible error-correction step. 
Bennett has shown that it is possible (at least in principle) to perform an unlimited 
amount of computation without any energy dissipation, thereby giving rise to a more 
                                                        
18
 Note that this paradox is the result of a thought experiment rather than of some observed phenomena. 
One approach that provides a quantitative resolution of this paradox is the Fluctuation Theorem (Evans 
& Searles, 2002). This theorem quantifies the probability of observing violations of the second law in 
small systems observed for a short time. Still, it applies to small-scale systems, whereas here the whole 
universe is considered as one closed system. 
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realistic model of a physical reversible computer (1973). However, for the purpose of 
our discussion, this comes at a cost. 
Are physical implementations of reversible computational models time-symmetric? 
Bennett’s  reversible model  computes functions bi-directionally:  once  in  a  “forward 
direction”  to  obtain  and  save  the  computation  result,  and  then in a “backward 
direction”. Bennett’s construction of a reversible TM uses a history tape as discussed 
above. When the TM halts, its output is copied to a special output tape and the history 
tape  is  used  to  “undo”  the  computation (Sutner, 2004, p. 319). Using  Bennett’s 
technique only the input and the output of the computation are preserved19. Other, 
more recent, attempts propose different reversible models of computation that also 
assume a time-symmetry of the computation. Lange et al. propose a reversible TM 
that “periodically restarts its computation (progressively enlarging its allotted space) 
from an initial configuration which may or may not be legal and which may or may 
not correspond to the ‘true’  initial  configuration […]  on  [input] w”  (2000, p. 365, 
italics added). Incidentally, it is not clear what an illegal initial input would be, if we 
considered the universe to be a reversible TM. 
Does a computational process have an intrinsic arrow of time (thereby proceeding 
in a single direction)? Some have argued that a computational system moves only in a 
“forward  direction”  in  a manner  that  is  aligned with  the  increase  of  entropy  in  the 
universe (Schulman, 2005). But, arguably, any computational process that may take 
place in an entropy-increasing universe, may equally take place in an entropy-
decreasing universe (Maroney, 2009). On the basis of statistical mechanical 
arguments, Owen Maroney shows that whilst computational processes may have an 
                                                        
19 Using Lecerf’s method  instead, once  the computation  is undone only  the  input  remains, assuming 
that the TM accepts the input. Otherwise, the simulation process does not terminate (Sutner, 2004, p. 
319). 
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intrinsic arrow of time, there are no grounds for linking any computational arrow to 
the thermodynamic arrow of time. If that is right, then a reversible computational 
universe proceeding in an entropy-decreasing direction is at odds with the second law 
of thermodynamics. 
By way of concluding this section, we make three last observations pertaining to 
miscomputation20, input and garbage collection. Firstly, if the evolution of the 
universe is computational (and not merely computable), what does it mean for the 
universe to miscompute? In accordance with the example of Kepler’s laws of motion 
for planets discussed in Section 2, would a miscomputation in some region of the 
universe result in a planet being thrown out of orbit? Although some 
arithmetic/logical operations, such as negate and increment, are invertible, 
multiplication, for example, allows the possibility of multiplication by zero and losing 
much of the previous information prior to the multiplication. So, unlike division by 
zero, which is strictly undefined, multiplication by zero is permitted yet irreversible.  
Furthermore, when considering physical realisations of idealised computational 
systems errors cannot be ignored. The computing billiard-balls in Fredkin and 
Toffoli’s  (idealised)  model  of  a  reversible  computer would be very unreliable in 
reality. Any instability resulting from arbitrarily small disruptions to the regular path 
of the balls by some external influence may lead to the proliferation of errors. These 
errors can be corrected, but the error correction process is irreversible, for it has to 
erase the erroneous information. 
Secondly, there still remains the question of the input to a closed computational 
system.  If  the universe  is  “all  that  exists”,  then even assuming  the Big Bang as  the 
                                                        
20 ‘Miscomputation’ here means a computational error or malfunction, which may occur when a 
physical computational system fails to correctly follow some step of the algorithm and thereby possibly 
produce an incorrect output. 
 28 
initial state of the universe, where did the initial input to the universe come from? 
That is curious, for by definition there is nothing outside the universe. Incidentally, 
based on Calude’s result regarding the limited capacity of computational processes to 
produce new information (2009, pp. 84–85), we conjecture that, being a reversible 
computational closed system, the universe can only produce limited new information. 
Calude shows that there is no algorithm that produces an infinity of output strings 
of unbounded information. The universe started in a state of low entropy (though it 
was in thermal equilibrium for the given constraints, volume, etc.). Provided that new 
information can be produced algorithmically only in a bounded quantity, it seems 
implausible that a closed system all of whose processes are algorithmic and 
deterministic will lead to a state of maximal entropy. If that is right, it is at odds with 
the second law of thermodynamics. 
Thirdly, standard models of reversible computation  generate  “garbage” 
information that must eventually be discarded due to the finiteness of the universe. 
Whether  we  consider  reversible  algorithms  or  reversible  Boolean  gates,  “garbage” 
outputs are added  in addition  to  the “real” outputs. A reversible Boolean AND-gate 
can be built by adding “garbage” output lines. That is, rather than being a two-input, 
one-output Boolean gate, it has the same number of input and output lines. This 
design allows input to always be deducible from the output (Li & Vitányi, 2008, p. 
631). Similarly, the limitation of Bennett’s reversible TM model is space rather than 
time.  When  space  is  limited,  there  may  not  be  enough  space  to  store  “garbage” 
information. This inevitably results in the need to irreversibly erase some “garbage” 
information (Vitányi, 2005, p. 440). 
It seems that from the point of view of a finite universe changing in an entropy-
increasing  direction,  “garbage”  information should be discarded to allow the 
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production of new information. From the point of view of a computational process “a 
garbage  object  […  is]  inaccessible  and  cannot  influence  the  future  course  of  the 
computation”  (Baker, 1992, p. 512). Still, for the overall system (the computational 
universe)  “the [garbage] object is still accessible, and will be reclaimed by the 
[garbage] collector”  (ibid). In  reversible  computational  systems  “garbage” 
information  does  not  “influence”  the  future  evolution  of  the  computation.  It is 
redundant information designed to allow the reconstruction of the computational 
history  of  the  system.  Yet,  once  the  “garbage”  information  is  “collected”  there  is, 
inevitably, some information loss. The need to record some redundant information, 
but then destroy it when extra storage space is needed raises some interesting 
questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the physical laws of the 
“computational” universe. 
6 Conclusion 
Whilst Floridi’s claim that reality in itself is not digital may seem plausible, we argue 
that it is not well justified. He claims that digital and analogue are not features of the 
modelled system in itself, but of some particular LoA modelling the system. He 
asserts, but does not establish, that it is only LoAs that are analogue or digital not 
noumenal reality. 
Rather than arguing against digital ontology, it has been the burden of this paper to 
argue against deterministic (discrete) computational ontology. That has been done in 
two parts. The first part (Section 4) has argued specifically against an irreversible 
computational view of the universe. The main reason is that irreversible computations 
discard information, whereas the information in the universe, according to the second 
law of thermodynamics, increases over time. The second part (Section 5) has argued 
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against a deterministic reversible computational view of the universe. Several 
challenges have been raised against a computational, deterministic and reversibly 
computational nature of the universe. It is our contention that even if the physical laws 
of the universe are computable, the universe need not be computational. 
Appendix 
In order to make our analysis above more self-contained and accessible for readers of 
different backgrounds,  we  provide  below  a  brief  summary  of  some  of  Popper’s 
arguments, which are relevant for our discussion. He argued that most physical 
systems are indeterministic (Popper, 1950a, 1950b). Popper equated (physical) 
indeterminism with the doctrine that “not all events are ‘determined’ in every detail'” 
(1950a, p. 120). Conversely, determinism was taken to be the doctrine that all events 
are determined, without exception, whether future, present or past. By  “determined 
events”  he  meant  events  that  are  “predictable  in  accordance  with  the  methods  of 
science”  (ibid).  The unpredictability of events under consideration is such that it 
cannot be  “mitigated by  the predictability of  their  frequencies”  (ibid, p. 117, italics 
added). This account of determinism makes it scientifically refutable. 
Moreover, the predictability of events is, according to Popper, a physical 
impossibility. An unpredictable observable event may still be correctly described 
fortuitously. So the predictability of such event is not logically impossible, but rather 
physically impossible by means of the rational methods of prediction in physics. 
These methods include the acquisition of initial information by observation (ibid, pp. 
117-118). Popper showed that in an important sense all scientific predictions are 
deficient even from the perspective of classical physics. 
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Furthermore, Popper suggested that the deterministic character of classical 
Newtonian mechanics is illustrated by the story of the Laplacean demon, a 
superhuman omniscient entity  (ibid, p. 122). If all the natural laws were in the form 
of equations, which uniquely determine the future from the present state, then by 
having a perfect knowledge of the initial state of the world (the initial information) 
and using mathematical deduction this demon would be able to predict every future 
state of the world. This kind of predictability is arguably deterministic, for it implies 
that given the foreknowledge of any future state (based on the initial information), all 
future states must be determined now, because past, present and future states are all 
necessarily connected. 
To ground this nonphysical demon in a physical realm, Popper proposed to replace 
it with a calculating predicting machine – Predictor (ibid, p. 118). Predictor (which is 
in fact a computer) was designed according to the laws of classical physics so as to 
produce permanent records of some type (say, a write-once TM tape) that can be 
interpreted as predictions of the positions, velocities, and masses of physical particles. 
Popper argued that Predictor could never fully predict every one of its own future 
states, and the part of the world with which it interacts. He showed that either no such 
Predictor could exist in the physical world or its future states could not be predicted 
by any existing Predictor (ibid, p. 119). 
The crux of Popper’s Predictor argument is that just as indeterminism in quantum 
physics is related to the measurement problem, in classical physics the interaction of 
Predictor with the system it measures (possibly itself) results in a similar 
indeterminism. If Predictor B measures another Predictor A, then B amplifies the 
signals from A. When another Predictor C measures the system A+B, C must also 
interact and amplify the signals from A+B. It is further assumed that B must also 
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measure  C  and  that,  Popper  argued,  leads  to  the  breakdown  of  the  “one  way 
membrane”  between B  and C  and with  it  the  conditions  for  successful  predictions. 
None of these Predictors can have knowledge of its own state before that state has 
passed. Each Predictor can obtain information about its own state only either by 
studying the results obtained by another Predictor or by being given these results 
(ibid, pp. 129-130). Also, he showed that there could not be an infinite series of 
Predictors, such that the n
th
 Predictor is superior to its predecessors. Only on the 
assumption that for every Predictor P there exists some P
+
 that is not only superior to 
P but also undetectable by P does the finite determinist doctrine hold (ibid, pp. 131-
133). 
Another version of  the Predictor argument was based on a variation on Russell’s 
Tristram Shandy paradox. Tristram Shandy attempts to narrate his full autobiography 
and in so doing he spends more time on the description of the details of every event 
than the time it took him to live through it. His autobiography, accordingly, rather 
than reaching a state of being “up to date” with present time, becomes more and more 
out of date. Even if Tristram Shandy is arbitrarily fast in narrating the full description 
of his history, he must be incapable of bringing it completely up to date (Popper, 
1950b, p. 174).  
Popper proposed another Predictor (call it TP) that is endowed with a memory in 
which results of its calculated predictions and the initial information received are 
stored. TP receives accurate and complete information about its state at time T0 and is 
tasked to predict some future state at time Tn. For every physical machine, there is a 
maximum running speed and as a result a minimum length of time needed for 
completing even the shortest description of which that machine is capable. Therefore, 
it cannot be simply assumed that the series of time intervals between T0 and Tn when 
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TP attempts to perform its prediction task converges. TP must retain in memory not 
only records of the final predictions, but also intermediate partial results of its 
calculations. Any description will take at least as much memory space as the 
description of the state to be predicted. Since the memory space, which can be used 
before Tn has elapsed, is finite, the description of TP’s memory cannot be completed 
before Tn regardless of TP’s speed (Popper, 1950b, pp. 175–177). 
The  last argument presented here  is Popper’s Oedipus Effect, according to which 
prediction can influence the predicted event (ibid: pp. 188-190). The point is that the 
receipt of complete information about its immediate past by a Predictor C will 
ultimately change its future state, since C is designed to act upon the informative 
signals received. This self-information qualifies as a strong interference with the 
working of C. Still, some very superior C
+
 may foresee the future state change caused 
by  C  receiving  the  information,  and  give  C  inaccurate  information  about  C’s  state 
ingeniously designed to induce C to make correct predictions about itself. However, 
no finite piece of information can be precise self-information. For the finite self-
information must contain a description of itself and this is impossible, as there cannot 
be a bijection from a finite data set S to a smaller subset of S. 
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